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You are a California lawyer, representing a U.S.-based international
mining company incorporated in the State of Delaware with its main
place of business in California. Your client is entering into a joint venture
agreement to exploit mining rights in Namibia with a Chinese
multinational and a local Namibian investor. The parties are having
difficulty agreeing on a choice-of-law and arbitration provision in the
contract.
Each lawyer will attempt to negotiate for the governing law to be the
law of the domicile of his or her own client with arbitration to take place
in a location that is most convenient for that client. As you will be unable
*
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to reach agreement, you will have to propose an alternative "neutral"
legal system and arbitration venue. A good choice would be arbitration
in South Africa, governed by South African law.
The South African legal system is highly developed and employs
many modern, sophisticated juristic concepts and vehicles. It has a body
of case law and legal textbooks (mostly written in English) that are easily
accessible online. It has a developed system of arbitration, with which the
South African courts rarely interfere. To the extent that the decision of a
South African arbitrator may be challenged in court, the South African
judicial system is the most reliable and independent one in Africa.
This Article examines the advantages and disadvantages of arbitrating
African-based disputes in South Africa and choosing South African law
as the governing law. Part I contains a brief synopsis of the South African
legal system and its judiciary and an overview of some of the comparative
legal systems of selected sub-Saharan African countries. It also analyzes
South Africa's choice-of-law rules, its rules relating to the computation
of damages, and its aversion to punitive damages. Part II analyzes the
South African law of arbitration and the very limited circumstances in
which South African Courts will interfere with the decisions of an
arbitrator.
I. THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM'

A. The South African Law and the CourtSystem
The South African legal system combines elements of Roman-Dutch
law and English law. The common law is Roman-Dutch in origin, but is
influenced by English law.2 South African company law represents a
1. Citations in this Article are mainly to cases reported in various published South African
Law Reports, which are obtainable both online and in hard copy. There are also references to
certain cases that are not reported in the ordinary law reports but appear in an online compendium
called Judgments Online (JOL). Cases that have the letters "CC" at the end of the citation are
decided by the Constitutional Court. Cases that have the acronym "SCA" are decided by the
Supreme Court of Appeal. References to "ZASCA" are to SCA cases reported only on the SCA's
website.
2.

H.R. HAHLo & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND

ITS

BACKGROUND 562-71 (1965). See Rood v. Wallach, 1904 TS 186, 201 (the Court held that South
African contract law was Roman-Dutch in origin. Accordingly, the English doctrine of
consideration did not apply in South African contract law. South Africa therefore recognizes that
contracts can be entered into without consideration provided that the agreement is "not manifestly
impossible, made deliberately and seriously, by persons capable of contracting and having a
ground or reason which is not immoral or forbidden by law"). Conradiev. Rossouw, 1919 AD 27
(followed Rood v. Wallach); Minister of Justice v. Hofmeyr 1993 (3) SA 131 (AD) 154-55 (the
court held that the South African law of "delict" (tort) is derived from Roman-Dutch law); 8
WILLEM ADOLF JOUBERT, THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1st reissue, pt. I T 6 (2007); SILBERBERG
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homegrown development of statutes that originated in England. The
court system and the rules of evidence are almost entirely English in
character and are therefore familiar to American practitioners.'
There is no need for American or English lawyers to be alarmed by
the Roman-Dutch origins of South African law. Roman-Dutch law was
the law that governed Holland before the advent of the Code Napoleon.
It continues to have much in common with the civil law systems of
Europe, including Italy, France, Germany, and Spain. It also has
commonality with the laws of Scotland and Louisiana.
Prior to the Napoleonic wars, the European settlement in what is now
the Western Cape Province of South Africa, was a Dutch colony.6 After
the Napoleonic wars, England took control of the Cape.7 The English
permitted the Cape settlers to retain Roman-Dutch law as the common
law.8 However, the procedural system imposed on the Cape was English
in nature.9
After the Anglo-Boer war ended in 1902, all of South Africa fell under
British control.' 0 The court system in twentieth-century South Africa
generally followed the English system." Even the structure of the legal
AND SCHOEMAN: THE LAW OF PROPERTY

6-7 (5 ed. 2006) (South African property law is based

upon Roman law principles with "various traces of Germanic customary law"); CHRISTIE'S LAW
OF CONTRACT IN SOUTH AFRICA 200 (6th ed. 2011) (the parol evidence rule that is applied in South

Africa "has long formed a part of the English law of evidence which, subject to the Civil
Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1995 and the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988,

forms the basis of our law of evidence in civil proceedings"); Bayly v. Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548
(SCA) para. [22]-[24] (In a claim of oppression brought by a minority shareholder against a
majority shareholder, the South African court largely followed the decision of the English House

of Lords in O'Neill & Another v. Phillips & Others, [1999] 2 All ER 961).
3.

4 JOUBERT, supra note 2, pt. 1, at 6 TT 2-7.

4.

DAVID T. ZEFFERTT ET AL., THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 5-16 (2003).

5.

HAHLO & KAN, supra note 2, at 520-22, 562-65; ZEFFERTT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-

9; BEAT LENEL, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND ITS ROMAN-DUTCH ROOTS (2002),

http://www.lenel.ch/docs/history-of-sa-law-en.pdf.
6. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 2, at 520-22,
9; LENEL, supra note 5.
7. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 2, at 520-22,
9; LENEL, supra note 5.
8. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 2, at 520-22,
9; LENEL, supra note 5.
9. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 2, at 520-22,
9; LENEL, supra note 5.
10.

562-65; ZEFFERTT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5562-65; ZEFFERTT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5562-65; ZEFFERTT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5562-65; ZEFFERTT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-

HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 2, at 590-95; 1 HERBSTEIN AND VAN WINSEN THE CIVIL

PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURTS OF SOUTH AFRICA 4-21 (A. Cilliers et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter Cilliers et al.]; ZEFFERTT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-9; WILLE'S PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW 64-76 (Frangois Du Bois ed., 9th ed. 2007).
11. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 2, at 590-95; Cilliers et al., supra note 10, at 4-2 1;
ZEFFERTT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-9; WILLE'S PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW, supra note

10, at 64-67.
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profession is English. Barristers (called advocates in South Africa) appear
in court in English-style robes of post-medieval origin, after being hired
by firms of solicitors (called attorneys in South Africa).
The record of most (but not all) accessible South African case law
starts after 1902. In interpreting Roman-Dutch law over the last century,
the South African courts have sometimes looked to English law sources
where Roman-Dutch law required further development in order to bring
it into line with modern economic structures.1 2 The result is that many of
the solutions adopted by the South African courts in connection with
commercial contract matters may be familiar to English common law
trained lawyers.
South African company law is primarily statutory in nature,' 3 but it is
not limited to statutory law. It has also developed "its own inner common
law which is not to be found in any specific identifiable provision." 1 4
South African company law is heavily influenced by English company
law. The first Southern African Companies Act, the Cape Joint Stock
Companies Limited Liability Act of 1861, was based on earlier English
company legislation." Similarly, the first South African Companies Act
enacted after South Africa became the Union of South Africa, the South
African Companies Act 46 of 1926, was also based on English statutory
law.' 6 As the South African company law was largely based on English
company law, the "inner common law," being the court's decisions
interpreting sections of the Companies Act was also based upon English
law. 17
While English judicial decisions in connection with the Companies
Act are not binding on South African courts, they are afforded great
deference. 18 However, when looking at English precedents differences in
the respective legal systems and statutes must be taken into account.19 In
2008, a new Companies Act was passed, which modernized some of the

12. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 2, at 590-97; WILLE'S PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW,
supra note 10, at 60-66. For example, the South African courts have largely followed English
courts in analyzing the court's discretion to refuse to grant specific performance of a contract by

a defaulting party in circumstances where damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff,
where it would be difficult for the court to enforce its decree, where the thing claimed could be
easily bought anywhere; or where specific performance entailed the rendering of services of a
personal nature. Haynes v. King Williamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 37 (AD); Farmers CoOp Society (Reg v. Berry), 1912 AD 343, 350.
13. 4 JOUBERT, supra note 2, at 6, ¶ 2.
14. Id

15. Id. pt.1, at7,¶3.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id.
19.

Id
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English law concepts. 2 0 This Act also provides for business rescue, which
is similar to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 2 1 The South
African law of evidence in civil matters employs English evidentiary
principles. 22 The rules of civil procedure also have strong English law
origins. 23
South African case law and statutes are well organized and readily
accessible. The various South African law reports go back to the 1860s
but are not nearly as prolific (or complex) as U.S. or English law
reports. 24 The law of South Africa in all areas is well summarized and set
out in Joubert'sEncyclopedia on the Law ofSouth Africa. The quality of
South Africa's judiciary is of a relatively strong standard for a developing
nation. While it may not be regarded as highly as that of England, the
United States, Canada, Australia or New Zealand, it is certainly the
strongest in Africa.
20.
21.
22.

The Companies Act 71 of 2008.
Id. §§ 128-155; cf U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, U.S.C., Ch. 11, §§ 1121-1129.
Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965; Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of
&

1988; CHRISTIE's LAW OF CONTRACT IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 200; C.W.H. SCHMIDT
H. RADEMEYER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1-14 to 1-24 (2000).

After the second British occupation of the Cape in 1806 . .. the [Roman-Dutch]

-

substantive law was left largely unaltered, but English law, evidential and
procedural law were later introduced. In this way our adjective law lost its
Continental character and become linked to the other great system of procedure
and evidence: that of the Anglo-American countries. In the field of criminal
procedure this meant that the inquisitorial system was abandoned and replaced
by an accusatorial (or adversarial) system. The latter is characterized, so far as

the law of evidence is concerned, by the mainly passive role of the judge in the
calling and examination of witnesses, by the accused's right to elect not to give
evidence and by the inadmissibility of certain kinds of evidence even where such
evidence is relevant to the issues. In the field of civil procedure the AngloAmerican system also differs from that of the continent, in that the judge's role
is more passive and the admission of evidence is more strictly regulated.
Id.
23. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 2, at 590-95; Cilliers et al., supra note 10, at 4-21;
ZEFFERTT ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-9; WILLE'S PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW, supra note

10, at 60-76.
24.

South African Law Reports include, among others: South African Law Reports

Appellate Division: 1910-1946; Decisions of the Cape High Court and subsequent Cape
Provincial Division commencing 1850-1946, decisions of the Transvaal High Court and

Provincial Division commencing in 1902-1946, decisions of the Natal High Court commencing
in 1893-1946; decisions of the Orange Free State Provincial Division from 1910-1946. All of the
pre-1946 Law Reports can be found online in Butterworths All South Africa Reports produced by
Lexis Nexis. Law Reports of the various divisions of the High Court commencing in 1947 to the
present are contained in the South African Law Reports published by Juta; in addition, decisions
of the South African Court not found in the Juta publication of the South African Law Reports

can be located, in Judgments on Line (JOL).
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For those readers of this Article who followed the Oscar Pistorius trial,
you will have seen that the court functioned in a manner very similar to
an English Court. The Judge was measured and careful and exercised
tight control over the proceedings. Pistorius certainly had a fair trial.
25
Ultimately, the trial judge's verdict was reversed on appeal. But this too
is a sign of a viable independent legal system that accommodates many
differences of opinion.
As South African courts have a limited ability to supervise the conduct
of arbitrations, the question arises: how independent are South African
judges? The answer is that they are fiercely independent. Although many
South African judges are members of the ruling African National
Congress, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal
(SCA) have consistently ruled against the Government when the
executive has crossed the bright lines set out in the Constitution. President
Zuma, for example, has suffered many major defeats in the South African
Constitutional Court and the SCA.2 6
In Economic Freedom Fightersv. Speaker of the NationalAssembly
2016 (3) SA 580 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that the President of
the Republic of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, was required to pay the fiscus
for non-security upgrades to his private home. In the process of delivering
its judgment, the court lambasted the President and the National
Assembly and stated:
[83] The President thus failed to uphold, defend and respect the

25.

Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v. Pistorius2016 (2) SA 317 (SCA) para.

[57]. JA Leach, who delivered the judgment of the majority of the court stated:
Before closing, it is necessary to make a final comment. The trial was conducted
in the glare of international attention and the focus of television cameras, which
must have added to the inherently heavy rigours that are brought to bear upon

trial courts in conducting lengthy and complicated trials. The trial judge
conducted the hearing with a degree of dignity and patience that is a credit to the
judiciary. The fact that this court has determined that certain mistakes were made
should not be seen as an adverse comment upon her competence and ability. The

fact is that different judges reach different conclusions and, in the light of an
appeal structure, those of the appellate court prevail. But the fact that the appeal

has succeeded is not to be regarded as a slight upon the trial judge who is to be
congratulated for the manner in which she conducted the proceedings.

Id.
26. See DemocraticAlliance v. African Nat'l Congress 2015 (2) SA 232 (CC) (S. Aft.),
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2015/1.html;President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. M&G

Media, Ltd. 2015 (1) SA 92 (A) (S. Afr.); http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2014/124.html;
Nat'l Dir. ofPub. Prosecutionsv. Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (A) (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/

cases/ZASCA/2009/1.pdf; Zuma v. Nat'lDir. ofPub. Prosecutions2009 (1) SA I (CC) (S. Afr.),
http://www.saflii.org/zalcases/ZACC/2008/13.html.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss2/4

6

Levenberg: Arbitration and Choice of Law in Sub-Saharan Africa

ARBITRATION AND CHOICE OFLA WIN SUB-SAHARIAN AFRICA

2016]

247

Constitution as the supreme law of the land. This failure is
manifest from the substantial disregard for the remedial action
taken against him by the Public Protector in terms of her
constitutional powers. The second respect in which he failed
related to his shared section 181(3) obligations. He was dutybound to, but did not, assist and protect the Public Protector so as
to ensure her independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness
by complying with her remedial action. He might have been
following wrong legal advice and therefore acting in good faith.
But that does not detract from the illegality of his conduct regard
being had to its inconsistency with his constitutional obligations
27

[99] By passing that resolution [seeking to effectively nullify the

findings of the Public Protector against the President] the National
Assembly effectively flouted its obligations. Neither the President
nor the National Assembly was entitled to respond to the binding
remedial action taken by the Public Protector as if it is of no force
or effect or has been set aside through a proper judicial process.
The ineluctable conclusion is therefore, that the National
Assembly's resolution based on the Minister's findings
exonerating the President from liability is inconsistent with the
Constitution and unlawful.2 8
Although the South African judiciary is the strongest in Africa, there are
(as in every jurisdiction) weaker judges. However, the appellate court's
correctional powers are generally wider than those of U.S. courts, so there
is plenty of room to correct a bad judgment on appeal.
There are other advantages to arbitrating in South Africa.
Johannesburg is one of the easiest airports to fly into in Africa with
airlines to most major international cities. South Africa's cities have
developed infrastructures with good roads, a relatively stable electricity
supply, clean water and world-class accommodations. There are also
good arbitration facilities available and technologically savvy court
reporters who can produce transcripts overnight.
Another advantage to arbitrating in South Africa is that legal fees are
relatively low compared to the developed world, and even compared to
27.

Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the Nat'IAssembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC)

para. 83 (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/1 .html.
28.

Id. para. 99; see also Democratic Alliance v. Acting Nat'l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions

Gauteng Div. Pretoria2016 (8) BCLR 1077 (GP) para. 92-94, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
ZAGPPHC/2016/255.html (holding National Director of Public Prosecutions improperly
succumbed to political pressure when he dropped criminal prosecution against President. The
decision of the National Prosecuting Authority was set aside, and, as a result, the prosecution
against the President was reinstated).
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other African countries. Commercial lawyers in most African countries
quote their fees in U.S. dollars because the currencies of their country are
not stable. In comparison, South African lawyers bill in South African
rands. This is a currency that is frequently declining against the dollar,
but an impact on legal fees does not occur until a year or two later. At the
time of writing this Article, Senior Barristers in South Africa are billing
at approximately $250-$350 per hour.
29
The South African court system is unitary in nature and not federal.
At the lowest end of the court spectrum are magistrate's courts with
limited jurisdiction, which does not include the power to review
arbitration awards. 3 0 Above them are High Court judges, who are
appointed by a Judicial Services Commission until they reach mandatory
retirement age. 3 1 Those High Court judges sit as trial judges and
32
combinations of them sit in the first court of appeal from time to time.
The court above the High Court is the SCA.3 3 The SCA, like the High
Court, can hear all civil matters (including arbitration reviews and
constitutional matters).3 4 Constitutional law cases and matters that are of
great public interest can also go on appeal from the SCA to the
Constitutional Court. 3 5
B. The RelationshipBetween the South African Legal System and
Those of Other Sub-SaharanCountries
In evaluating the benefits of choosing South African law and a South
African arbitration venue, it is necessary to have some understanding of
the manner in which South Africa and its legal system relates to those of
other sub-Saharan countries.
South Africa is a member of the Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC), a customs union between 15 sub-Saharan African
29.

Cilliers et al., supra note 10, at 10-20; Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

§§ 4-7, 15-20;

5 JOUBERT, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 324-44 para. 285-301; Constitution of the Republic of South

Africa Act 108 of 1996 §§ 165-170.
30. Magistrate's Court Act 32 of 1944; Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 [hereinafter Arbitration
Act] (see definition of "court" in section 1); 3 JOUBERT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 3 para 1.
31. In terms of the Judge's Remuneration and Employment Act 47 of 2001: (1) the
mandatory retirement age for High Court judge is 70 years unless that judge has not yet completed
10 years of service. In that event, the judge may remain in office until he or she completes 10

years of active service; and (2) a Constitutional Court judge must retire at the age of 70 or after
he or she has completed 12 years of service as a Constitutional Court judge, whichever occurs
first, provided that the 12 year period can be extended under certain circumstances.

32. Superior Court Act 10 of 2013 § 16.
33. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
Act 10 of 2013 § 16.
34. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
Act 10 of 2013

35.

§

16 read with

§ 21; Arbitration

Act, supra note 30,

§

§ 168; Superior Courts

1 (definition of "court").

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss2/4
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countries which also includes Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia,
Malawi, Mozambique, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Madagascar, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Mauritius and the
Seychelles. 36
Apart from South Africa, five other SADC countries (Namibia,
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Lesotho) have Roman-Dutch
based legal systems with laws almost identical to those of South Africa.3 7
The decisions of the Namibian High Court are in fact reported in the
South African Law Reports. Similarly, many of the decisions of the
Zimbabwe High Court can be found in the South African Law Reports.
Zambia and Tanzania have English common law based systems that
have significant commonality in commercial matters with the South
African legal system. 3 8 Although Kenya and Nigeria are not members of
SADC, they also have English based legal systems.3 9 Considerable
respect is accorded in English-speaking SADC countries to the judgments
of the South African courts. 4 0
There are significantly fewer textbooks enumerating the law
published in sub-Saharan countries outside of South Africa. In addition,
many of these countries do not have publications with their own recorded
judicial precedent as emanating from the opinions of local judges. As
South African law is easily accessible and determinable, arbitration in
South Africa under South African law is preferable to arbitration in other
African countries under other local laws.
C. Choice ofLaw
South African conflict of law jurisprudence is also Roman-Dutch in
origin. 4 1 However, it is heavily influenced by English choice of law
principles. 42 The general rule to be applied is that the law of the place in
which the contract is concluded, the lex loci contractus, "governs the
36.

See website of Southern African Development Community List of members,

Wikipedia (Southern African Development Community).
37. LENEL, supra note 5.
38. Alfred S. Magagula, The Law and Legal Research in Zambia, HAUSER GLOBAL LAW
SCHOOL PROGRAM (Oct. 2009), www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/zambia.sfm; Bahame Tom
Nynduga & Chrisabel Manning, Guide to Tanzanian Legal System and Legal Research, HAUSER
GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL PROGRAM (Nov. 2006) (sections on sources of law), www.nyulawglobal.
org/globalex/Tanzania.html.
39. Global Ethics Observatory (GEObs), www.unesco.org/shs/ethics/geo/user (search for
Kenya and Nigeria); Kenya Law: How does Kenya's Legal System Work?, KENYA ADVISOR,
www.kenya-advisor.com/kenya-law.html; Christian N. Okeke, African Law in Comparative Law:
Does Comparativism Have Worth, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS UNiv. L. REv. 32 (2011) (regarding
Nigerian law).
40. See, e.g., Magagula, supra note 38; Okeke, supra note 39, at 32.
41. 2 JOUBERT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 292 ¶ 283.

42. See Guggenheim v. Rosenbaum 1961 (4) SA 21 (W) at 31 A-C (S. Afr.).
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nature, the obligations and the interpretation of the contract ... At the
same time it must not be forgotten that the intention of the parties to the
contract is the true criterion to determine by what law its interpretation
and effect are to be governed." 4 3 This means that, where the parties have
expressly agreed that a particular law will govern, the courts will honor
this, provided that the foreign law is not contra bonos mores (contrary to
public policy). 44
An example of a law that is contrary to public policy in South Africa
is one that would allow a lender to recover accrued and unpaid interest
on a loan that exceeds the full amount of the principal or "capital"
advanced to the borrower (i.e., interest at more than the "double"). 45 This
does not mean that a lender cannot obtain interest that exceeds the
principal amount of the loan, only that the lender cannot allow unpaid
interest to accrue and reach an amount greater than the principal amount
of the loan.4 6
Similarly, a South African court will not enforce a contract which
contains an exemption clause that permits one of the parties to avoid
liability for fraud.47 Of course, if an agreement contains a U.S. (or other)
choice-of-law provision, the clause will be honored by an arbitrator and
by the South African courts, unless the foreign law would result in the
implementation of a rule that is contrary to public policy in South
Africa.4 8
A good reason to choose South African law instead of the law of an
American jurisdiction is that South African law does not allow the award
of punitive damages. 4 9 For a large American multinational contracting
with a much smaller local company in Africa, the elimination of the risk
of punitive damages is very advantageous. South African courts are also
unlikely to enforce an arbitration award of punitive damages, except
perhaps where the punitive damages do not have the effect of permitting
the plaintiff to obtain what is considered to be unconscionable
compensation for the damage done to it.5 0
43.
Afr.).

StandardBank of S. Afr., Ltd. v. Efroiken & Newman 1924 (1) AD 170 (A) at 185 (S.

44.

Guggenheim, (4) SA at 30-31; Berman v. Winrow, 1943 TPD 213, 216; Jones v. Krok

1995 (1) SA 677 (A) at 685 B-E (S. Aft.).
45. Taylor v. Hollard 1886 (2) SAR 78 at 82-83 (S. Aft.); Jones v. Krok 1996 (1) SA 504
(T) at 515 1 (S. Aft.); Standard Bank of S. Afr., Ltd. v. Oneanate Invs. (Pty.), Ltd. 1998 (1) SA
811 (A) at 828C-E (S. Aft.); Paulsen v. Slip Knot Invs. 777 (Pty), Ltd. 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC) para
42 (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2015/5.html.

46. Margo v. Gardner2010 (6) SA 385 (A) at 385 D-E (S. Aft.).
47. Wells v. S. African Alumenite Co. 1927 AD 69 (A) at 72 (S. Aft.).
48. Guggenheim (2) 1961 (4) SA 21 (W) 38.
49. Jones v. Krok 1996 (1) SA 504 (T) at 515 F-H (S. Aft.); Santam
VersekeringsmaatskappyBpk v. Byleveldt 1973 (2) SA 146 (A) at 152 H (S. Aft.).
50. Jones, 1996 (1) SA 504 (T) 516 E, 517 G.
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In Jones v. Krok,' the plaintiff had obtained a large damages award
in California against a South African citizen that included punitive
damages. The plaintiff sought to enforce the judgment in South Africa.
The plaintiff was not permitted to enforce that portion of the damages
award that allowed for punitive damages. In the process of disallowing
the award for punitive damages the court held:
It is the policy of South African law and practice that for breach of
contract the injured party is entitled to no more than compensation
for the damages actually suffered by him. The quantum is not in
any way dependent upon, or influenced by, the reprehensible
behaviour of the defendant or the flagrancy of the breach .... The
same applies to the assessment of the quantum of damages under
the lex Aquilia ... 2
It is thus trite that the award of punitive damages in such instances,
in which category falls the award in this case, is alien to our legal
system.
The mere fact that awards are made on a basis not recognised in
this country does not entail that they are necessarily contrary to
public policy ...
. 54
In principle it would be wrong to refuse to enforce a foreign order
of punitive damages merely because it is unknown in this country.
In my view it cannot be said that the principle involved is
necessarily unconscionable or excessive or exorbitant.
The punitive damages awarded [in this case] amount, for all
practical purposes, to granting the plaintiff double the amount of
damages she claimed and was awarded. The fact that the trial
Judge reduced the jury's subjective calculation does not assist the
plaintiff. The award was granted because of the reprehensible
behaviour of the defendant. On a parity of reasoning with the facts
in Taylor's case the award is so excessive and exorbitant that, in
my view, it is contrary to public policy in this country; by that I
mean that to double an already high award which was adequate

51.

Id.

52. Id. at 515 G. The old Roman law upon which the South African law of "delict" (i.e.,
tort) is based.
53. Id. at 515 H.
54.

Id. at 515 1.

55.

Id. at 516 E.
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compensation cannot be countenanced. 5 6
In addition, South African courts require that damages be proved with
a reasonable amount of precision, that is to say, they adopt a "sum
formula" approach. Damages should reflect the actual measure of an
aggrieved party's financial loss. However, the courts may employ a small
element of guesswork where the best evidence available as to damages is
insufficient to deal with all contingencies.
II. ARBITRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. The Approach of the South African Courts to Arbitration
South African courts and legislation favor arbitration. In Lufuno
Mphaphuli and Associates (Pty.), Ltd. v. Andrews, the Constitutional
Court held:
[196] Private arbitration is widely used both domestically and
internationally. Most jurisdictions in the world permit private
arbitration of disputes and also provide for the enforcement of
arbitration awards by the ordinary courts. With the growth of
global commerce, international commercial arbitration has
increased significantly in recent decades. This growth has been
fostered, in part, by the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards (the New York
Convention) which provides for the enforcement of arbitration
awards in contracting states and which has had a profound effect
on arbitration law in many jurisdictions. ..59
[197] Some of the advantages of arbitration lie in its flexibility (as
parties can determine the process to be followed by an arbitrator,
including the manner in which evidence will be received, the
exchange of pleadings and the like), its cost-effectiveness, its
privacy and its speed (particularly as often no appeal lies from an
arbitrator's award, or lies only in an accelerated form to an
appellate arbitral body). In determining the proper constitutional
approach to private arbitration, we need to bear in mind that
56.

Id. at 517 G.

57. J.M. POTGIETER ET AL., VISSER AND POTGIETER: LAW OF DAMAGES 71-72 (3d ed. 2012);
see also Rudman v. Rd. Accident Fund 2003 (2) SA 234 (A) at 235 A-H (S. Afr.); Union Gov't v.

Warneke (1) 1911 AD 657 (A) at 665 (S. Afr.).
58. Hushon v. Pictech 1997 (4) SA 399 (A) at 412 H (S. Afr.).
59. Lufuno Mphaphuli & Assoc., Ltd. v. Andrews 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) at 585 C-D (S.
Afr.).
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litigation before ordinary courts can be a rigid, costly and timeconsuming process and that it is not inconsistent with our
constitutional values to permit parties to seek a quicker and
cheaper mechanism for the resolution of disputes.6 0
Similarly in Zhongji Development Construction Engineering Co. v.
Kamoto Copper Co., the court held:
[29] [Ojur law of arbitration is not only consistent with but also in
full harmony with prevailing international best practice in the field.
Since 1976 our country has been a party to the New York
Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards 10
June 1958, widely known as the "New York Convention." The
duty of our courts to support international arbitration and to give
effect, where they can, to international arbitration agreements is
bolstered by the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards Act 40 of 1977.61
[30] . .. South African courts not only have a legal but also a
socio-economic and political duty to encourage the selection of
South Africa as a venue for international arbitrations. International
arbitration in South Africa will not only foster our comity among
the nations of the world, as well as international trade but also
bring about the influx of foreign spending to our country. 6 2
Sections 2-4 of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards Act 40 of 1977 (Enforcement Act) provides for enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards in South African courts. The circumstances in
which a foreign arbitral award will not be enforced in our courts are
generally limited to situations where: (1) the award would be "contrary
to public policy" in South Africa; (2) adequate notice has not been given
to the parties; or (3) the award deals with a dispute that falls outside the
provisions of the relevant arbitration agreement. 6 3 As South Africa has
ratified the New York Convention, South African arbitral awards can
similarly be enforced in other convention countries, such as the United
States. 6

60.

Id. at 585 F-586 A-B.

61.

Zhongli Dev. Constr. Eng'g Co. v. Kamoto Copper Co. SARL 2015 (1) SA 345 (A)

para. 29 (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2014/160.html.
62.
63.
64.

Id. para 30.
Enforcement Act § 4.
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, arts.

11 & 111; Andrews 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) para. [196].
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B. The Role ofSouth African Courts in Relation to PrivateArbitration
Conducted on South African Soil
An arbitration agreement does not completely exclude the jurisdiction
of the courts. The courts retain supervisory powers over the arbitration
process. These powers include: indirectly enforcing the provisions of an
arbitration agreement by granting a stay of any litigation initiated in a
court pending the outcome of an arbitration; setting aside or terminating
an arbitration agreement in certain limited circumstances; removing or
appointing arbitrators; enforcing arbitration awards by making them
orders of court; setting aside arbitration awards on review on various
limited grounds; extending certain time limits provided for in the
arbitration statute; ordering discovery of documents and security for
costs; and granting an interim interdict (injunction) in order to preserve
the status quo pending the outcome of an arbitration. 6 5
It needs to be emphasized that, although the South African courts
appear to have a laundry list of supervisory powers in connection with
arbitration in order to ensure that the process is conducted fairly or to
supplement gaps in an arbitration agreement, the courts' powers to
interfere in the arbitration process are extremely limited and will only be
exercised within zealously circumscribed limits.
In Zhongji, the SCA considered whether it had jurisdiction to
supervise an arbitral process or enforce an arbitral award where the
parties were both peregrini (non-residents) of South Africa and the
contract was to be performed outside of South Africa. 6 6 However, the
contract had an arbitration clause that provided that the arbitration was to
take place in the province of Gauteng in South Africa. 6 7 The court held
that, once the arbitration had commenced, the High Court in Gauteng
would have jurisdiction to exercise its power of supervision in terms of
68
the South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 (Arbitration Act).
C. The ArbitrationAgreement and the Powers of the Arbitrator
Although the South African common law provides for arbitration, the
primary source of modem arbitration law in South Africa is the
Arbitration Act as it has been interpreted by the courts. 6 9 Where there is
a dearth ofjudicial authority on a particular point of arbitration law, South

65.

1 JOUBERT, supra note 2, at 402

¶ 548; Arbitration

Act, supra note 30,

§§

3, 6, 7, 8, 12,

13, 20, 21, 31, 32 & 33.
66. Zhongji, (1) SA 345 (A) para. 18.
67. Id. para. 4.
68. Id. para. 37.
69.

1 JOUBERT, supra note 2, at 399 T 543.
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African courts will often look to English law.7 0 However, English cases
should be used with caution because some of those cases are decided
based upon the particular language of various English arbitration
statutes.7 1

Section 1 of the Arbitration Act defines an "arbitration agreement" as
"a written agreement providing for the reference to arbitration of any
existing dispute or any future dispute relating to a matter specified in the
agreement, whether an arbitrator is named or designated therein or not." 72
Arbitration clauses in South Africa, like arbitration clauses in many other
parts of the world, are generally widely worded to cover most disputes
directly or indirectly related to a particular agreement or transaction.
Some arbitration clauses expressly provide that the arbitrator will have
jurisdiction to decide issues relating to his own jurisdiction.
Although an arbitration agreement has to be in writing, it does not
have to be signed by the parties to be enforceable. 7 3 In terms of section 2
of the Arbitration Act, certain matters are expressly excluded from the
ambit of arbitration-"matrimonial causes" or related matters, or any
matter relating to a party's status.7 4 W le certain other matters are not
expressly excluded from arbitration, they cannot be referred to arbitration
because the power to grant the remedies sought are, under the relevant
enabling statutes, conferred only on the courts. Examples of this type of
dispute are: (1) transactions in which a minority shareholder seeks relief
from "oppression" by a majority shareholder who controls the company
(this is a special statutory remedy that is equitable in nature afforded to
shareholders under section 163 of the South African Companies Act 71
of 2008); (2) a claim for liquidation of a company (i.e., placing a company
in bankruptcy); and (3) a claim to pierce the corporate veil under section
20(9) of the Companies Act. 7 5
A party accused of fraud may insist that the dispute be tried in a court

70.

Zhongfi Dev. Constr. Eng'g Co., Ltd. v. Kamoto Copper Co. SARL 2015 (1) SA 355

para. [31], [32] & [59] (S. Afr.).
71. Van Heerden v. Sentrale Kunsmis Korporasie(Edms.) Bpk 1973 (1) SA 17 (A) 29 AH (S. Afr.); Christie [1994] 111 SALJ 146-48; 1 JOUBERT, supra note 2, at 400 ¶ 544; Telcordia

Techs., Inc. v Telkom SA, Ltd. 2007 (3) SA 266 para. [151]-[154] (S. Afr.).

§

72.

Arbitration Act, supra note 30,

73.

See Pitt v. Pitt 1991 (3) SA 863 (D) at 864 (S. Afr.).

74.

Arbitration Act, supra note 30,

75.

Peel v. Hamon J& CEng'g (Pty.), Ltd. 2013 (2) SA 331 (SGHC) para. [68] (S. Mr.).

1.

§ 2.

The court held that an arbitrator did not have the power to grant relief to an oppressed minority
shareholder because section 163 of the Companies Act conferred that power only upon a court.
Similar considerations apply in the case of: (1) the liquidation of a company which can only be
ordered by a court in terms of sections 346 and 347 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, which

remains applicable with respect to liquidations of insolvent companies under Schedule 5, section
9 of the New Companies Act 71 of 2008; (2) an order piercing the corporate veil in terms of

section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, which only a court can make.
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rather than before an arbitrator in order "to allow the party accused
thereof the opportunity of having so grave a personal imputation
adjudicated upon in open court." 76 However, as a practical matter, it is
unlikely that many parties accused of fraud will choose to litigate that
issue in open court rather than in the privacy of an arbitration.7 7
Even where an arbitration agreement does not expressly confer
jurisdiction upon an arbitrator to determine issues relating to his own
jurisdiction, a South African arbitrator is nevertheless obliged to make a
preliminary enquiry into the merits of the jurisdictional objection. In
Radon Projects (Pty.), Ltd. v. N V Properties(Pty.), Ltd., the court held:
[28] . . . When confronted with a jurisdictional objection an

arbitrator is not obliged forthwith to throw up his hands and
withdraw from the matter until a court has clarified his jurisdiction.
While an arbitrator is not competent to determine his own
jurisdiction that means only that he has no power to fix the scope
of his jurisdiction. The scope of his jurisdiction is fixed by his
terms of reference and he has no power to alter its scope by his
own decision (in the absence of agreement to the contrary).

-

[29] But that does not preclude him from enquiring into the scope
of his jurisdiction and even ruling upon it, when a jurisdictional
objection is raised. He does so at the risk that he might be wrong
in which case an award he makes will be invalid - but in some
cases it might be convenient to enter upon the arbitration
nonetheless. 7 9
The effect of this legal doctrine is that a reluctant defendant in an
arbitration cannot defeat the arbitrator's jurisdiction by raising a spurious
objection to jurisdiction. The arbitrator is bound to make at least a
preliminary enquiry into the validity of the objection. If the arbitrator
rules that he has jurisdiction, the matter will proceed until a Court orders
that it should cease.
Once the arbitration has commenced, the arbitrator is bound to ensure
that it proceeds with "all reasonable dispatch" and cannot terminate the
76.

Per Solomon AJ in Rawstorne v. Hodgen 2002 (3) SA 433 (W) para. [25] (S. Afr.);

Peel, 2013 (2) SA 331 (SGHC) para. [69]; Scriven Bros. v. Rhodesian Hides & ProduceCo., Ltd.

1943 AD 393, 402 (S. Afr.).
77. Lufuno Mphaphuli & Assocs. (Pty.), Ltd v. Andrews 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) para. [197]
(S. Afr.).
78. Radon Projects (Pty.), Ltd. v. N V Props. (Pty.), Ltd. 2013 (6) SA 345 (A) para. 28-29
(S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/zalcases/ZASCA/2013/83.html.
79. Id. para. 29; see also Christopher Brown, Ltd. v. Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer
Waldbesitzer Holzwirtschaftsbetriebe Registrierte Genossenschaft Mit Beschrankter Haftung

[1954] 1 QB 8 at 13 (Eng.).
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arbitration proceeding unless the parties agree that he should, or the court
so orders it.80 Unless there is a contrary intention expressed in the
arbitration agreement, the reference is to a single arbitrator.si Of course,
if the parties agree that there should be more than one arbitrator, the
arbitration will proceed before the number of arbitrators agreed upon.82
It is not uncommon for South African arbitration agreements to
provide for the appointment of a single arbitrator to try the matter with a
built-in arbitration appeal process." In that situation, the arbitration
agreement usually provides that the losing party in the arbitration has a
right of appeal to an arbitration appeal panel consisting of three
arbitrators, to be apointed in a manner, or by a body, that the parties
have agreed upon. 4 Many South African legal practitioners prefer to
have an appeal procedure in the arbitration agreement. Whether one
should agree to an appellate process is always a hard decision to make. I
am not usually in favor of an appeal process because it prolongs the
arbitration.
Some arbitration agreements provide for the appointment of three
arbitrators, with one to be appointed by each party and the third to be
appointed by the two arbitrators appointed by the parties. The
appointment of three arbitrators in this manner is sometimes preferred by
attorneys preparing arbitration agreements on behalf of contracting
parties who come from different jurisdictions. Personally, I do not favor
the appointment of three arbitrators, because it increases the expense of
the proceedings. It also tends to draw the proceeding out because hearings
are subject to the availability of all three arbitrators. If the parties desire
to put their faith in the hands of three arbitrators instead of one, an
appellate procedure is cheaper and more effective. An advantage of an
appeal process within the arbitration (for the ultimate winner) is that it
tends to limit the ability of the courts to interfere in the arbitrator's award
on review. This is because the openings for review of an appeal panel's
award are more limited than the possibilities for reviewing the award of
a single arbitrator who commits a serious irregularity in the conduct of
the arbitration.
It is not uncommon for dispute resolution clauses in South Africa to
contain a provision that requires that the CEOs of the parties meet first in
an attempt to resolve the dispute. Thereafter, if they fail to resolve the
dispute, the matter goes to mediation before it can go to arbitration. I do
80.

Arbitration Act, supra note 30,

§

13(2).

8 1. Id § 9.
82. See id § 9-12.
83. Lufuno Mphaphuli & Assocs. (Pty.), Ltd. v. Andrews 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) at 585 F586 A-B (S. Afr.).
84. Id. 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) 585 F-586 B-B; Hos+MedMedical Aid Scheme v. Thebe Ya
Bophelo HealthcareMktg. & Consulting (Pty.), Ltd. 2008 (2) SA 608 para. [10] (S. Afr.).
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not favor these clauses for the following reasons.
First, if the parties are really intent on litigation, the CEO's meeting
is usually a futile exercise. The requirement that they meet often delays
the commencement of the arbitration. Second, if the parties are intent on
litigating, mediation is similarly futile. It is also expensive. Third, if the
parties do not properly go through all the preliminary processes before
the arbitration commences, the defendant may assert that the dispute
sought to be arbitrated has not been through all the necessary gates before
arbitration can commence. These mediation provisions are therefore
often a weapon in the hands of an uncooperative defendant.
Accordingly, it is preferable not to insert a clause into an arbitration
agreement that renders negotiation or mediation a pre-condition to
arbitrating. In my experience, mediation only works when the parties
have a genuine desire to resolve the dispute through mediation. In that
event, the parties can voluntarily agree at the time when the dispute arises
to go to mediation before arbitration if there is a realistic prospect of
achieving a settlement.
Where the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement and one
party commences legal proceedings against the other in a court, the court
has the power to grant a stay of the legal proceedings pending the
outcome of the arbitration. 5 The party wishing to invoke the arbitration
clause has a choice: it can request a stay at the start of the action under
section 6 of the Arbitration Act, or it can raise a special "dilatory plea"
under the common law that seeks to have the court action stayed pending
the outcome of an arbitration. 8 6 Before a stay is granted or a matter can
be referred to arbitration, there must be an arbitration dispute between the
parties that "is capable of proper formulation. . . ."8 It follows that, if the
plaintiffs claim is not disputed by a defendant on some articulated
ground, no stay should be granted because there is no dispute to be
referred to arbitration.8 8
D. Proceduresto be Followed by the Arbitrator
Frequently, the parties agree in the arbitration agreement on the rules
89
of procedure that they will follow in the event of arbitration. It is not
§ 6.

85.

Arbitration Act, supra note 30,

86.

Id.; Nick's FishmongerHoldings (Pty.), Ltd. v. De Sousa 2003 (2) SA 278 (SE) 281 B-

C (S. Afr.); Van Heerden en Andere v. Sentrale Kunsmis Korporasie (Edms.) Bpk 1973 (1) SA

89.

See, e.g., Hos+Med Med Aid Scheme v. Thebe Ya Bophelo Healthcare Mktg.

&

17 (A) 26 B (S. Afr.).
87. Telecall (Pty.), Ltd. v. Logan 2000 (2) SA 782 (A) 786 1-J (S. Afr.).
88. Parekh v. Shah Jehan Cinemas (Pty.), Ltd. 1980 (1) SA 301 (D) 304 E-G (S. Aft.);
Altech Data (Pty), Ltd. v. MB Techs. (Pty.), Ltd. 1998 (3) SA 748 (W) 763 D-F (S. Afr.).
Consulting (Pty), Ltd. 2008 (2) SA 608 (SCA) para. [91-[101, [30] (S. Afr.); Holford v. Carleo
Enters. (977/2013) [2014] ZASCA 195 (Nov. 28, 2014) para. [7]-[9] (S. Afr.).
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uncommon in South Africa to provide that the arbitration will be
conducted according to the rules of a particular arbitration body. In South
Africa, the most common arbitration body is the Arbitration Foundation
of South Africa (AFSA), an institution that is supported by barristers and
solicitors alike and supervised by a senior and well-respected barrister.
Parties often choose to follow the South African Rules of Court when the
arbitration commences. 90 If the arbitration agreement does not oblige the
parties to follow the rules of a particular arbitral institution or of the court,
the parties usually end up agreeing that the arbitration will be governed
by the South African Rules of Court. If the parties have not agreed on the
procedure to be followed, the arbitration tribunal has fairly wide powers
to determine the procedure. 9 1
The traditional view is that, in the absence of an agreement between
the parties to the contrary, the arbitration tribunal is obliged to apply the
formal South African rules of evidence. 92 The South African rules of
evidence are very similar to the English rules of evidence. In fact, analysis
of several interrelated statutes, indicates that the South African law of
evidence started out in 1961 (when South Africa became an independent
nation and withdrew from the British Commonwealth) as being the same
as the English law of evidence as it existed on 30 May 1961.93 The South
African law of evidence has evolved since 1963 through statute and the
eventual enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
Act 108 of 1996.94 However, it has retained its essentially AngloAmerican character.9 5
Accordingly, Anglo-American lawyers are not likely to have
difficulty applying South African rules of evidence in an arbitration that
takes place in South Africa. The parties are, however, at liberty to exclude
or limit the application of the rules of evidence. 96 The courts are unlikely
to set aside an award because the arbitrator has failed to comply with the
strict rules of evidence, unless the failure results in a breach of natural
justice.97
The discovery process in South Africa is similar to English procedure,
90. See, e.g., Hos+Med Med Aid Scheme, 2008 (2) SA 608 (SCA) para. [9]-[10], [30];
Holford, (977/2013) [2014] ZASCA 195 (Nov. 28, 2014) para. [7]-[9].
91.
92.

Arbitration Act, supra note 30, § 14.
1 JOUBERT, supra 2, at 432 ¶ 586.

93. See Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 (S. Aft.) (replacing Civil Proceedings
Evidence Act 14 of 1962 (S. Afr.)).
94.

CHRISTIAAN WILLEM HENDRIK SCHMIDT & HENK RADEMEYER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

1-13 to 1-24 (1st ed. 2003) (updated from year to year).

95.

Id. at 1-14.

96.

1 JOUBERT, supra note 2, at 432 1 586; Benjamin v. Sobac SA Building & Construction

(Pty), Ltd. 1989 (4) SA 940 (C) 964J-965A.
97.

1 JOUBERT, supra note 2, at 432

¶

586; see also Benjamin, 1989 (4) SA 940 (CPD) at

964 1-965 A.
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but simpler than in U.S. jurisdictions. For one thing, depositions are not
part of the procedure.9 8 This significantly reduces the costs of litigation
and the likely scope of pre-trial disputes.
There is a popular misconception among American lawyers that trials
in jurisdictions (such as South Africa) that follow English procedure are
"trials by ambush." This is not correct. Full discovery of all relevant
documents is usually required in trial proceedings. 99 Similarly, even if the
arbitration agreement does not provide for it, South African arbitrators
have the power to require full South African-style discovery of
10
documents and often insist upon it.o
The procedures for obtaining copies of all relevant documents are
simpler than those in the United States in the sense that the first call for
discovery does not require the parties to list all categories of documents
that they seek.' 0 1 Initially the parties simply seek all "relevant
documents." If one of the parties suspects that the other party has not
discovered all relevant documents, the aggrieved party may then request
specific categories of documents that it believes to be in the possession
of the other parties and that it maintains are relevant to the action. 10 2
Rule 21 of the South African Rules of Court (which is often applied
in arbitration proceedings) does not allow wide-ranging interrogatory
requests. It permits one party to request further particulars to the other
party's pleading for the purpose of preparing for trial. However, a party
may request only such particulars as are "strictly necessary" in order to
enable it to prepare for trial.'o3
In larger arbitrations, it has become commonplace in South Africa to
require both parties to file witness statements in advance setting out the
testimony-in-chief (i.e., direct testimony) of their witnesses. This further
reduces the element of surprise in the litigation and enables the parties to
dispense with the need at the hearing for most evidence-in-chief (direct
examination). When witness statements have been provided, each
witness simply confirms the contents of the statement under oath when
she testifies, and the other party then launches straight into crossexamination.

98. S. African Uniform Rules of Court r. 21 (2009) (which deals with further particulars
for trial, similar to limited interrogatories); id r. 35 (which deals with discovery, inspection and
production of documents); id. r. 36 (which deals with inspections, examinations and expert
testimony).

99.
100.

See id r. 35.
Arbitration Act, supra note 30,

§ 14(1)(a)(i).

101. S. African Uniform Rules of Court, supra note 98, r. 35(1); see 2 COMMENTARY IN
ERASMUS: SUPERIOR COURT PRACTICE DI -460 (2015).

102.
103.

S. African Uniform Rules of Court, supra note 98, GN R315 of Mar. 12, 1999, r. 35(3).
Id. r. 21(2).
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E. Termination of an ArbitrationAgreement
The general principle is that, unless the agreement provides otherwise,
an arbitration agreement shall not be capable of being terminated except
by consent of all of the parties thereto.1 04 This principle admits of certain
exceptions. Our courts have held that, where a contract comes to an end
or is terminated as a result of breach, the arbitration clause in that
agreement survives, and the dispute can be determined by arbitration.os
South African courts have also accepted that the arbitration clause is
severable in the case of an avoidable contract. 10 6 However, they have not
been prepared to accept, as a general principle, that an arbitration clause
will survive a main contract that was void ab initio (i.e., from the start).1 0 7
Recently, the South African courts have recognized that they should
adopt "a liberal construction of an arbitration clause [because of] the
presumption in favour of one-stop arbitration." 0 8 In Zhongfi, the court
also held that:
[59] With reference to the Rules and the international trend
referred to and relied on by both parties, it is clear that if courts
arrogate to themselves the right to decide matters which the parties
have agreed should be dealt with by arbitration, the likelihood of
this country being chosen as an international arbitration venue in
future is remote in the extreme. Persons wishing to have their
disputes resolved by arbitration do not wish the process to be
retarded by constant recourse to courts. 1 0 9
As was said by Lord Hofmann:
In approaching the question of construction, it is therefore
necessary to enquire into the purpose of the arbitration clause. As
to this, I think there can be no doubt. The parties have entered into
a relationship, an agreement or what is alleged to be an agreement
or what appears on its face to be an agreement, which may give
rise to disputes. They want those disputes decided by a tribunal
104. Arbitration Act, supra note 30, § 3(1).
105. Atteridgeville Town Council v. Livanos Bros. Elec. 1992 (1) SA 296 (A) at 305 B-I (S.
Afr.); Sera v. De Wet 1974 (2) SA 645 (T) at 648 D-E (S. Afr.); Scriven Bros. v. Rhodesian Hides

& Produce Co., Ltd. 1943 (1) AD 393 (A) at 401 (S. Afr.).
106.

1 JOUBERT, supra note 2, at 410

¶

558; Airline Mineral Dev. Corp. (Pty.), Ltd. v

Gemsbok Vlei Kwartsiet (Edms.) Bpk 1968 (1) SA 7 (CPD) 12D-14F (S. Afr.); Zhongji Dev.
Constr. Eng'g Co., Ltd v. Kamoto Copper Co. SARL 2015 (1) SA 345 (SCA) para. [311 (S. Aft.).
107. See Wayland v. Everite Grp., Ltd 1993 (3) SA 946 (W) at 951 H-I (S. Afr.).
108.

Zhong/i, 2015 (1) SA 345 (A) para. 32; see also Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v.

Privalov [2007] EWCA (Civ.) 20, [19] (Eng.).
109. Zhongji, 2015 (1) SA 345 (A) para. 32.
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which they have chosen, commonly on the grounds of such matters
as its neutrality, expertise and privacy, the availability of legal
services at the seat of the arbitration and the unobtrusive efficiency
of its supervisory law. Particularly in the case of international
contracts, they want a quick and efficient adjudication and do not
want to take the risks of delay and, in too many cases, partiality, in
proceedings before a national jurisdiction.
If one accepts that this is the purpose of an arbitration clause, its
construction must be influenced by whether the parties, as rational
businessmen, were likely to have intended that only some of the
questions arising out of their relationship were to be submitted to
arbitration and others were to be decided by national courts. Could
they have intended the question of whether the contract was
repudiated should be decided by arbitration but the question of
whether it was induced by misrepresentation should be decided by
a court? If, as appears to be generally accepted, there is no rational
basis upon which businessmen would be likely to wish to have
questions of the validity or enforceability of the contract decided
by one tribunal and questions about its performance decided by
another, one would need to find very clear language before
deciding that they must have such an intention. 110
The language of Zhongii quoted above demonstrates how strongly the
South African courts favor minimal interference with arbitration
proceedings. One way to strengthen the likelihood that all disputes (even
most questions concerning the voidness of a contract) can be decided by
arbitration is to insert a specific clause in the arbitration agreement that
provides that, even if the main contract is void, the arbitration clause will
survive and the question of the voidness of the contract will itself be
decided by way of arbitration.' 11 However, even such a clause is not
infallible. For example, if the signature on the document was induced by
fraud or the person entering into the contract was not authorized to bind
one of the parties thereto, there could be an absence of real consent to the
arbitration clause as well as to the terms of the main agreement.1 12
Section 3(2) of the Arbitration Act provides:

-

(2) The court may at any time on the application of any party to an
arbitration agreement, on good cause shown
set aside the arbitration; or
order that any particular dispute referred to in the arbitration
110. Id.para. 59.
111. Van Heerden v. Sentrale Kunsmis Korporasie(Edms.) Bpk 1973 (1) SA 17 (A) 30BF (S. Afr.).
112. Zhongi, 2015 (1) SA 345 (A) para 32.
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agreement shall not be referred to arbitration; or
order that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with
reference to any dispute referred.1 13
Although the words "good cause" look like a far-reaching phrase, the
circumstances in which a South African court will terminate an
arbitration agreement or end an arbitration are rare indeed. The court's
discretion must be exercised judicially and there should be "'compelling
reasons' for refusing to hold a party to its agreement to refer disputes to
arbitration." 1 4 A "very strong case" must be made out to enable a party
to escape from the consequences of entering into an arbitration
15 The circumstances in which
agreement.s
courts have held that "good
cause" was shown, include situations where:
there has been such misconduct on the part of the arbitrator that he
is incapable of giving an impartial decision;"l 6
where it is necessary to join a third party, who is not a party to the
arbitration agreement, in order to procure a decision that binds all
interested parties. In such a case, insisting that the two parties to
the arbitration agreement go forward with the arbitration can lead
to a multiplicity of proceeding with potentially conflicting results,
which is undesirable. 117
F. Reference ofa ParticularPointofLaw to the Court
An arbitration tribunal may, on the application of any party to the
reference and shall, if the court, on the application of any party, so directs,
or if the parties to the reference so agree, at any stage before making a
final award state any question of law arising in the course of the reference
in the form of a special case for the opinion of the court or for the opinion
of counsel.' 1 8 If the court or the arbitrator accedes to an application by a
party to decide a particular question of law, the opinion rendered by the
court is "final and not subject to appeal" and is binding on the arbitration

§ 3(2).

113.

Arbitration Act, supra note 30,

114.

2 BEREND CRANS, AIRCRAFT REPOSSESSION ENFORCEMENT PRACTICAL ASPECTS 394

(Ravi Nath & Berend Crans eds., 2010).
115.

Metallurgical& Commercial Consultants, Ltd. v. Metal Sales Co., Ltd 1971 (2) SA

388 (W) at 391 E-H (S. Afr.), quoted in Sera v. De Wet 1974 (2) SA 645 (T) at 649 E-F (S. Afr.);
Rhodesian Rys., Ltd. v. Mackintosh 1932 (1) AD 359 (A) at 375 (S. Afr.); Universiteit Van

Stellenbosch v. JA Louw Bpk. 1983 (4) SA 321 (A) at 333 H (S. Afr.).
116.
117.
118.

Rhodesian Rys., 1932 AD at 375.
Metallurgical& Commercial Consultants, 1971 (2) SA at 393 G-394 D (S. Afr.).
Arbitration Act, supra note 30, § 20(1).
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tribunal and on the parties to the reference." 9 In Telcordia Technologies,
Inc. v. Telkom SA, Ltd. 2007 (3) SA 266 (SCA), the applicant for review,
Telkom SA, Ltd. (Telkom), perceiving that the arbitrator was likely to
rule against it, applied to the arbitrator to state a number of points of law
for consideration by the court. The arbitrator refused. The Supreme Court
of Appeal had to consider whether this refusal constituted a gross
irregularity. The court held that there was no gross irregularity.1 2 0
During the course of its judgment, the court considered the very
limited circumstances in which a party to an arbitration agreement could
obtain an order from an arbitrator or a court stating a question of law for
the court. The court indicated that application must be made first to the
arbitrator.12' The court then stated:
[153] If an arbitrator decides not to state a case, the aggrieved
party may under s20 approach the High Court. The court must then
determine whether or not the arbitrator had erred in the exercise of
his discretion as happened in Kildrummy and Midkon. If there is
no fault to be found with the arbitrator's exercise of his discretion,
the court cannot order him to state a case ...
[154] Moreover, s20 can be used only if the legal question arises
'in the course of of the arbitration. It is not intended to apply
where the parties agree to put a particular question of law to the
arbitrator. Any other interpretation of this section would defeat its
purpose and "it would be futile ever to submit a question of law to
an arbitrator." Its purpose, at the very least, is not to enable parties,
who have agreed to refer a legal issue to an arbitrator to renege on
their deal. They have in such a case chosen their decision-maker
for the particular issue and they are bound by their choice. In this
case, the primary question, as well as the validity of the
moratorium agreement, was specifically referred to the arbitrator
for his decision. To allow a party in these circumstances to utilize
s20 would frustrate the arbitration agreement. It is not against
public policy to agree to the finality of an extra-curial decision on
a legal issue especially where the review rights contained in s33
remain available, enabling the courts to retain control over the
fairness of the proceedings.
[155] Finally, a party does not have the right to have a
hypothetical question stated because it does not in truth "arise" in
the arbitration proceeding ...

19. Id. § 20(2).
120. Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Telkom SA, Ltd. 2007 (3) SA 266 (A) para. 156 (S. Afr.),
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2006/112.html.
121. Id. 1 [153].
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The matter stated for determination by the court must be an issue
of law only. It cannot be a mixed question of fact and law. 122

-

The point of law should be real and substantial and such is to be
open to serious argument and appropriate for decision by a court
of law. . . as distinct from a point which is dependent on the special
expertise of the arbitrator or umpire ... The point of law should be
clear cut and capable of being accurately stated as a point of law
as distinct from the dressing up of a matter of fact as if it were a
point of law. The point of law should be of such importance that
the resolution of it is necessary for the proper determination of the
case - as distinct from a side issue of little importance. 12 3
However, the South African law differs from the English law as laid
down by Denning MR in Halfdan Grieg in that the arbitrator is not
compelled to refer a pure question of law that meets all the qualifications
laid down in Lord Denning's test merely because one of the parties asked
for a referral. The arbitrator has a discretion to decide whether it is
appropriate to state a question of law for the opinion of the court or for
the opinion of counsel. One of the circumstances in which it would be
appropriate to state a point of law for determination by a court or counsel
is that the arbitrator is not legally trained, such as an architect appointed
to determine a dispute under a building contract. 124
In short, the qualifying test for stating a question of law for
determination by a court or counsel is so stringent, that the circumstances
in which this will actually occur are rare indeed, particularly where the
arbitrator is an experienced lawyer.
G. The Court'sAbility to Review the Decision ofan Arbitrator
The primary situation in which a party to an arbitration will likely seek
to have the court interfere is when that party has an adverse award made
against it. In that case, the party has the right to apply to court to review
and set aside the decision of the arbitrator.1 25 The application must be
made within six weeks after the publication of the award to the parties.1 26
The circumstances in which a Court can set aside an award on review
122.

Id.

[151]; Administrator, Transvaalv. Kildrummy Holdings, Ltd. 1978 (2) SA 124

(T) 127E- 128H (S. Afr.).
&

123. Per Denning MR in the English case of Halfdan Grieg & Co A/S v. Sterling Coal
Navigation Corp. & AC Neleman's Handel-en-Transportonderneming[1973] 2 All ER 1073 at
1077C-G, as endorsed by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Telcordia para. 151-154

and Kildrummy, 1978 (2) SA 124 (T) at 128A-H.
124. Kildrummy, 1978 (2) SA 124 (T) at 128H.
125.

Arbitration Act, supra note 30,

126.

Id.

§

33.

§ 33(2).
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are extremely limited. In terms of sections 33 of the Arbitration Act:
-

(1) Where

(a) any member of an arbitration tribunal has misconducted
himself in relation to his duties as arbitrator or umpire; or
(b) an arbitration tribunal has committed any gross irregularity in
the conduct of the arbitration proceedings or has exceeded his
powers; or
(c) an award has been improperly obtained,
the court may, on the application of any part to the reference after
due notice to the other party or parties, make an order setting the
award aside.' 2 7
Section 33(1)(a) and (c) speak for themselves. The circumstances in
which an award can be set aside on those grounds are rare indeed,
especially when the arbitrator is a reputable lawyer. Accordingly, most
reviews focus on whether there has been a "gross irregularity," or whether
the arbitrator has exceeded his powers in terms of section 33(l)(b).
In Lufuno Mphaphuli and Associates (Pty.), Ltd. v. Andrews, the
Constitutional Court (which is the highest Court in South Africa) held:
To return then to the question of the proper construction of s 33(1)
of the Arbitration Act in the light of the Constitution. Given the
approach not only in the United Kingdom (an open and democratic
society within the contemplation of s 39(2) of our Constitution),
but also the international law approach as evinced in the New York
Convention (to which South Africa is a party) and the UNCITRAL
Model Law, it seems to me that the values of our Constitution will
not necessarily best be served by interpreting s 33(1) in a manner
that enhances the power of court to set aside private arbitration
awards. Indeed, the contrary seems to be the case. The
international and comparative law considered in this judgment
suggests that courts should be careful not to undermine the
achievement of the goals of private arbitration by enlarging their
powers of scrutiny imprudently. Section 33(1) provides three
grounds for setting aside an arbitration award: misconduct by an
arbitrator; gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings; and
the fact that an award has been improperly obtained. In my view,
127.

Id.

§ 33(1)(a)-(c).
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and in the light of the reasoning in the previous paragraphs, the
Constitution would require a court to construe these grounds
reasonably strictly in relation to private arbitration. 12 8
In Naidoo v. EP Property Projects (Pty.), Ltd., the Supreme Court of
Appeal held:
The correct legal approach to a review of an arbitral award was
enunciated by Gardiner J in the dictum in Clark v. African
Guaranteeand Indemnity Co., Ltd 1915 CPD 68 at 77 as follows:
The court will always be most reluctant to interfere with the award
of an arbitrator. The parties have chosen to go to arbitration instead
of resorting to the Courts of the land, they have specially selected
the personnel of their tribunal, and they have agreed that the award
of the tribunal shall be final and binding....
One of the advantages which people are supposed to get by a
reference to arbitration is the finality of the proceedings when the
arbitrator has once stated his determination. They sacrifice
something for that advantage - they sacrifice the power to appeal.
If, in their judgment, the particular judge whom they have selected
has gone wrong in point of law or in point of fact, they have no
longer the same wide power to appeal which an ordinary citizen
prosecuting his remedy in the courts of law possesses, but they
sacrifice that advantage in order to obtain a final decision between
the parties. It is well-settled law, therefore, that when they have
agreed to refer their difficulties to arbitration as they have here,
you cannot set aside the award simply because you think it
wrong.1 29

The definitive South African case on what constitutes a "gross
irregularity" in terms of section 33(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act is
Telcordia Technologies, Inc. v. Telkom SA, Ltd. In that case, the Supreme
Court of Appeal enunciated basic principles appertaining to arbitral
review. First, an error of law, no matter how "material" it may be, is not
per se a gross irregularity.1 30 While errors of law can lead to gross
irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings (such as a denial of the
audi alteram partem principle 3 1) they are not reviewable in
128. Lufino Mphaphuli & Assocs. (Pty.), Ltd. v. Andrews 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) para. 235
(S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/6.html.

129. Naidoo v. EP Prop. Projects (Pty.), Ltd., No. (444/2012) [2014] ZASCA 97 para. 32
(July 13, 2014) (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2014/97.html.
130. Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Telkom SA, Ltd. 2007 (3) SA 266 (A) para. 67-69 (S. Afr.),
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2006/112.html.

131.

The principle that everyone has a right to be heard. Claassen: Dictionary of Legal
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themselves.1 32
Second, the arbitrator "has a right to be wrong." Accordingly, while
there "may be misconceptions about meaning, law or the admissibility of
evidence .. . that is a far cry from saying that" the arbitrator misconceived
the "nature of the enquiry."' 3 3 Similarly it is not a gross irregularity where
the arbitrator wrongly interprets a contract, bases his judgment upon a
wrong perception or application of South African law or upon an
incorrect reliance on inadmissible evidence.1 34
Third, a gross irregularity occurs "where a decision-maker
misconceived the whole nature of the enquiry or his duties in connection
therewith," or "he misconceived [his] mandate, whether statutory or
consensual. By misconceiving the nature of the enquiry a hearing cannot
in principle be fair because the body fails to perform its mandate." 3 5
Fourth, an error by an arbitrator does not amount to a gross irregularity
unless the mistake is so serious that it results in the arbitrator failing to
afford one of the parties a fair trial.1 36 In Ellis v. Morgan, the court held:
"An irregularity in proceedings does not mean an incorrect judgment; it
refers not to the result, but to the methods of trial, such as, for example
some high-handed or mistaken action which has prevented the aggrieved
party from having his case fully and fairly determined." 37 In Telcordia,
the Supreme Court of Appeal cited the judgment of the Full Bench of the
Transvaal Provincial Division in Goldfields Investment, Ltd. v. City
Council ofJohannesburgas follows:
The law, as stated in Ellis v. Morgan (supra) has been accepted in
subsequent cases, and the passage which has been quoted from that
case shows that it is not merely high-handed or arbitrary conduct
which is described as a gross irregularity; behaviour which is
perfectly well-intentioned and bona fide, though mistaken may
come under that description. The crucial question is whether it
prevented afair trial of the issues. If it did prevent a fair trial of
the issues then it will amount to a gross irregularity. Many patent
irregularities have this effect. And if from the magistrate's reasons
Words and Phrases: Vol 1 PA-182.
132.

Telcordia, 2007 (3) SA 266 (A) para. 68-69; see also Hyperchemicals Int'l (Pty.), Ltd.

v. Maybaker Agrichem (Pty.), Ltd 1992 (1) SA 89 (W) at 99 A-H (S. Afr.); Total Support Mgmt.
Ltd. v. Diversified Health Sys., Ltd. (457/2000) [2002] ZASCA 14 ¶¶ 18-19 (Mar. 25, 2002) (S.
Afr.); Goldfields Invs., Ltd. v. City CouncilofJohannesburg, 1938 TPD 551 (T), at 551.
133. Telcordia, 2007 (3) SA para. 85.
134. Id. para. 86.
135. Id. para. 71, 73.
136.

Fourways Precinct(Pty.), Ltd. v. BentelAssocs. Int'l (Pty.), Ltd. (49962/2013) [2014]

ZAGPPHC 343 ¶ 26 (June 11, 2014).
137. Ellis v. Morgan 1909 (1) TS 576 (T), at 581, cited with approval in Telcordia, 2007 (3)
SA para. 72 (emphasis added).
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it appears that his mind was not in a state to enable him to try the
case fairly, this will amount to a latent gross irregularity. If, on the
other hand, he merely comes to a wrong decision owing to his
having made a mistake on a point of law in relation to the merits,
that does not amount to a gross irregularity. In matters relating to
the merits the magistrate may err by taking a wrong one of several
possible views, or he may err by mistaking or misunderstanding
the point in issue. In the latter case it may be said that he is in a
sense failing to address his mind to the true point to be decided and
therefore failing to afford the parties a fair trial. But this is not
necessarily the case. Where the point relates only to the merits of
the case, it would be straining the language to describe it as a
gross irregularityor a denial ofafair trial. One would say that the
magistrate has decided the case fairly but has gone wrong on the
law. But if the mistake leads to the Court's not merely missing or
misunderstanding a point of law on the merits, but to its
misconceiving the whole nature of the enquiry, or of its duties in
connection therewith, then it is accordance with the ordinary use
of language to say that the losing party has not had a fair trial.' 3 8
Not every irregularity "would justify a review."l 39 The court must be
satisfied that the irregularity caused a substantial injustice. 140 The fact
that an arbitrator does not comment in detail upon any particular
argument in his award does not mean that he ignored that argument.1 4 1
The inference is usually that he considered the argument and rejected
it. 142

Because the test for a gross irregularity is so stringent, there are very
few cases reported in South Africa in which an arbitrator's decision was
set aside on that ground. The courts try very hard not to interfere with the
arbitrator's decision or to second guess it unduly.1 4 3 This is because the
courts recognize the importance of private arbitrations, especially in a
country like South Africa, which is attempting to attract foreign
investment and to set itself up as a home for multinational arbitration
throughout Africa.1 44
Naturally, the fact that the courts are reluctant to uphold reviews
138. Telcordia, 2007 (3) SA para. 73 (citing Goldfields Inv., Ltd. v. City Council of
Johannesburg1938 TPD 551 (T) at 560-61).
139.

Fourways Precinct, 2014 ZAGPPHC

¶ 31.

140. Id.
141. Telcordia, 2007 (3) SA para. 125.
142.
143.

Id.
Lufuno Mphaphuli & Assocs. (Pty.), Ltd. v. Andrews 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) para. 235

(S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/6.html.
144.

Zhongji Dev. Constr. Eng'g Co., Ltd. v. Kamoto Copper Co. SARL 2015 (1) SA 345

(SCA) para. [30] (S. Afr.).
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against arbitrators' awards, does not prevent losing parties from seeking
a review of the arbitrator's award.1 4 5 When the stakes are high, the
aggrieved party will frequently launch a review, even if there are slim
prospects of success. 146 Unfortunately, this has the effect of delaying the
execution of the arbitral award.
Reviews in which an arbitrator has exceeded his or her jurisdiction
have achieved more success, albeit of a limited nature. 14 7 It is very
common for South African lawyers who enter into arbitration agreements
in connection with litigation that has commenced to agree that the issues
that can be determined by the arbitrators are those that are set out in the
parties' pleadings. In such a case, the courts may, depending always upon
the language of the arbitration agreement, hold that the arbitrator
exceeded his jurisdiction when he decided an issue that had not been
pleaded by one of the parties. 14 8
Although the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld an objection to
jurisdiction on this basis in Hos+Med, it has shown a reluctance in a
subsequent case to apply the Hos+Med principle too strictly. 149 As
arbitration awards can be set aside if the arbitrator has exceeded his
jurisdiction, the issues referred to arbitration should be carefully defined
and formulated. Even where the court sets aside an arbitrator's award on
review, the court does not have the power to substitute a judgment or
award of its own.
The court is obliged to either refer the matter back to the same
arbitration tribunal or, at the request of either party, to a new arbitration
tribunal constituted in a manner directed by the court. 5 0 An objection to
jurisdiction should be raised as soon as the objectionable issue is
canvassed in the arbitration.' 51 If the complaint is not raised immediately,
the inference is usually that the other party participated knowingly and
voluntarily in the arbitration proceeding and accepted that the court had
jurisdiction. 1 5 2

145.

Arbitration Act, supra note 30,

§ 33.

146. See, e.g., Telcordia, 2007 (3) SA para. 125 & Lufino, 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) para. 235.
147.

Hos+Med Med. Aid Scheme v. Thebe Ya Bophelo Healthcare Mktg. & Consulting

(Pty.), Ltd. 2008 (2) SA 608 para. [30] (S. Afr.).
148. See id. paras. 31-32.
149. See Holford v. Carleo Enters. (Pty.), Ltd. 2014 ZASCA 195 T 9 (Nov. 28, 2014) (S.
Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2014/195.html.
150. See Hos+Med, 2008 (2) SA para. 37-44.
151. Naidoo v. EP Prop. Projects, Ltd., No. (444/2012) [2014] ZASCA 97 1 25 (July 31,
2014) (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2014/97.html.
152. Id. ¶ 27; Purser v. Sales 2001 (3) SA 445(A) 1 22 (S. Afr.); see also Holford, 2014
ZASCA T 10.
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III. CONCLUSION

South Africa has a sophisticated and developed body of arbitration
law. South Africa is a party to the New York Convention and has enacted
its own legislation to allow foreign arbitral awards to be enforced in South
Africa.1 53 South African courts are very supportive of arbitration as a
mode of resolving disputes and they view it is advantageous to the
economy of the country. This results in a policy of minimal interference
by the courts in the decisions of arbitrators sitting in South Africa.
However, the South African courts retain some residual powers of
supervision in order to prevent injustice. This can result in delay in the
finalization of arbitration disputes because of the need to complete any
process of review that is initiated after an award has been made.
South African courts will honor choice-of-law provisions that provide
that the contract is governed by South African law. South African law
presents certain advantages to American companies because it does not
allow for punitive damages and requires a relatively scientific mode of
proving damages and the causal relationship between a contractual
breach and the amount claimed. This reduces the level of prospective
liability faced by American firms contracting in Africa, who are often
perceived as having deep pockets. However, the South African courts will
honor any choice-of-law provision contained in an agreement between
the parties, provided that the foreign law is not contrary to public policy
in South Africa.
South Africa's judicial system is the most efficient system in Africa.
While some judges are stronger than others, they are consistently
independent in coming to their decisions and are not usually swayed by
the identity of a litigant. All of these facts make South Africa a good
venue for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts that have an
African connection.

153.

The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitrable Awards Act 40 of 1977.
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